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      Both papers explore, in a very condensed manner, two important theoretical 
issues directly touching upon the transgression of cultural boundaries. Let me start by 
responding to Prof.Wang's paper. 
     He makes refreshing use of a notion we have long forgotten ever since William 
Empson wrote of seven types of it. I am in complete agreement with him concerning 
the function of ambiguity in displacing the binaries, which, he writes, only evoke 
"opposition
," which is an exclusion. His two examples: the hodgepodge Chinese MTV 
and the Neo-San Zi Jing, which both substantiate and dismantle party philosophy, are 
also very interesting. I would, however, suggest that his arguments would further be 
enriched if the notion of agency were introduced. For instance, consider his examples 
of the students in uniform singing Madonna and those in bikini and with a Red Army 
cap singing a revolutionary song (I would sure like to have seen them, by the way!). 
Now, for whom are they the misplacement of symbols? The answer, says Prof. Wang, is 
mainly for the administration. China is then identified with socialist authorities. 
Although I am not particularly familiar with the current cultural situation of China, I 
doubt if the students created such performance from a like perspective, i.e. with the 
intention of misplacing symbols. At least, had the performance in question been viewed 
by a young Japanese audience, ambiguity might not have taken place. A youngster like 
me with a taste for progressive rock and roll would remember the concerts of a 
Japanese group, the Yellow Magic Orchestra, which played metallic synthesized music 
of Kraftwerk's kind, in fact wearing Red Army caps. Likewise, if the performance of 
the bikini girls with Red Army caps is a shock to the Chinese authorities, pornography 
with women in military outfits is a cliche in the Western world. Here again is an 
opportunity to ask my primary question concerning the theme of transgression of 
cultural borders. Who is crossing which borders? Who is, or is not, understanding who? 
Someone with a variety of national, cultural, linguistic, artistic, personal backgrounds 
and with a specific gender, class, age, ethnic distinction? 
     This leads me to the problem I had with Prof. Richardson's paper although on 
the whole I was much illuminated by the points he raised concerning the problem of 
translation and its relevance to the understanding of the other cultures. I am troubled by
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his introductory assumptions: "A process of translation is involved in my own 
construction of the language: I must translate inchoate thoughts into a form ordered by 
the English language. In writing I need to translate my ideas into a code I have learned 
and which is only inadequately able to represent what I really wish to say." Now, 
whether an idea precedes a language or not is a major question, over which the linguists 
of the world are in untiring debate. Surely Marx thought it did not (The German 
Ideology). But Prof. Richardson dismisses that question quite nonchalantly: "In some 
strange way I know my idea exists prior to its conceptualization." Let us now leave this 
profound question with the linguists, but at least I should argue that Prof. Richardson's 
model is Cartesian: I have something in my mind the meaning of which is clear to me; 
the remaining task is merely to find out how to externalize that something correctly, 
using a language. But do we really know what is in our mind? Or is a message we have 
in our mind always consistent? Is it just the communication that spoils this consistency? 
Here I am mainly thinking of the psychoanalytical critique of the consciousness. 
According to it, one's idea is profoundly ambiguous and ambivalent even before it gets 
verbalized externally (Of course, for Lacan one's idea is always already verbal and 
ambivalent.) The consistency and the transparency of one's own mind is probably a 
modern Western myth, originating in Descartes and culminating in a complex manner 
in Husserl. 
     Prof. Richardson applies that personal communicative model (one's consistent 
idea gets communicated to an outer world with varying degrees of success) to 
cultural/linguistic communication, commonly termed translation. The same problem for 
me persists. A culture is taken to be an organic whole within which an interpretation is 
clear and transparent. Just as one knows what one is thinking, a Japanese knows the 
meaning of any Japanese cultural tradition which may or may not be correctly 
interpreted by a foreign observer. Against the grain of such a model, I'd like to use Prof. 
Wang's example: did the Chinese authorities know what the Chinese students were 
doing any better than a foreign observer? Prof. Richardson seeks to find a way of 
understanding properly the true idea of one's partner in conversation (the personal level) 
and the true picture of other cultures (the intercultural and inter-linguistic level). The 
presumption is that something consistent must be there, waiting to be correctly 
interpreted by an outsider. But, does such a thing really exist? I know that when I say 
this I risk discouraging people from understanding whatever is not within one's 
cultural/social horizon. Yet, I see at the same time the danger of a political order in 
taking for granted an un-ambiguous self, an un-ambiguous cultural coherence, here, 
there, and everywhere, with the presumption of a single, consistent (personal/cultural) 
identity.
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     As a matter of fact, Prof. Richardson aptly points out the connection between 
the issue of language and translation, and the issue of identity. But, here, too, I would 
like to point to the ambiguity of identity that, incidentally, renders the act of translation 
itself ambivalent. Prof. Richardson writes that he cannot renounce his British identity 
even if he wishes to do so. That could be true in Britain, but in Japan, breaking away 
from the trap of identity is quite easy. Just choose not to pay respect to the national flag 
and anthem during some official ritual. Voila. One is a "hikokumin," a non-national, a 
Japanese who is not a Japanese. An article in the Asahi Shimbun (Dec. 2, Osaka 
edition) reports of a boy who refused to raise the flag at the sports festival and was 
interrogated by one of the organizers:" Aren't you a Japanese?" The article also reminds 
the readers of such a statement as the suggestion made earlier by the governor of the 
Gifu prefecture that any Japanese who does not respect the national flag or the anthem 
should renounce his/her citizenship. The Cartesian model of translation and the belief 
in a single identity are mutually complementary. 
     Some of the questions I raised concerning Prof. Richardson's paper are part of 
the larger question that has been, it seems to me, at stake all through our symposium. 
That question is: are there any human essentials not mediated by culture, language, 
codification, etc., yes or no? Prof. Richardson's answer is, yes, when he speaks of the 
human ideas that are subsequently verbalized and communicated with varying degrees 
of success. Prof. Oshima's answer, taken together with an Argentine anthropologist he 
quotes, is also yes: he points to a zero degree of ethics, and to faces without 
codification. I say, together with some of the participants, no. So does Clifford Geertz 
who writes about Bali mask theater actors in The Interpretation of Cultures. He writes 
that one tends to imagine a human being without any mask formulated by a culture with 
which he or she is associated, just like one can think of an actor of a Shakespearean 
play relaxing backstage and displaying his or her real self. But Geertz rejects that 
notion, insisting that a human being is always acting and is never without a mask. 
     I close my comments with this major question: should we assume a trans-
linguistic, trans-semiotic, raw humanity, or not? We should have asked this at the 
beginning of our symposium, which may have led to completely different sets of 
strategies concerning the transgression of cultural borders.
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